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Abstract This paper examines the two-way relationship between inequality
and economic fluctuations, and the implications for human development. For
years, the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics, which assumed that
income distribution did not matter, at least for macroeconomic behavior,
ignored inequality—both its role in causing crises and the effect of fluctuations
in general, and crises in particular, on inequality. But the most recent financial
crisis has shown the errors in this thinking, and these views are finally begin-
ning to be questioned. Economists who had looked at the average equity of
a homeowner—ignoring the distribution—felt comfortable that the
economy could easily withstand a large fall in housing prices. When such a
fall occurred, however, it had disastrous effects, because a large fraction of
homeowners owed more on their homes than the value of the home, leading
to waves of foreclosure and economic stress. Policy-makers and economists
alike have begun to take note: inequality can contribute to volatility and the cre-
ation of crises, and volatility can contribute to inequality. Here, we explore the
variety of channels through which inequality affects fluctuations and fluctu-
ations affect inequality, and explore how some of the changes in our
economy may have contributed to increased inequality and volatility both
directly and indirectly. After describing the two-way relationship, the paper dis-
cusses hysteresis—the fact that the consequences of an economic downturn
can be long-lived. Then, it examines how policy can either mitigate or exacer-
bate the inequality consequences of economic downturns, and shows how
well-intentioned policies can sometimes be counterproductive. Finally, it
links these issues to human development, especially in developing countries.
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Introduction
For years, the dominant paradigm in macroeconomics ignored inequality—
both its role in causing crises and the effect of crises on inequality. The
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dominant paradigm (particularly earlier variants with a representative agent)
assumed that income distribution did not matter (at least for macroeconomic
behavior).1 Not surprisingly, then, the dominant paradigm had little to say
about the impact of crises on inequality; or the converse, the impact of
inequality on economic stability.
One of the few positive outcomes of the crisis is that, finally, these views
are beginning to be questioned.2 As Jayadev (forthcoming) notes, citing data
from Piketty and Saez (2010), this crisis, like the Great Depression, was pre-
ceded by large increases in inequality.
Economists that had looked at the average equity of a homeowner—
ignoring the distribution—felt comfortable that the economy could easily
withstand a fall in housing prices of 20% or even more, because on average
indebtedness was less than 80% of the market price. But such a fall has had
disastrous effects, because it has meant that a large fraction of homeowners
are ‘underwater,’ owing more on their homes than the value of the home,
leading in turn to rates of foreclosure and widespread economic stress.
Policy-makers too have finally come around to recognizing the role of
inequality in this crisis—and in others. An April International Monetary
Fund (IMF) report examining the effects of inequality on growth stated:
We find that longer growth spells are robustly associated with more
equality in the income distribution . . . Over longer horizons,
reduced inequality and sustained growth may thus be two sides of
the same coin.3
In this brief paper, I discuss the two-way relationship between inequality
and economic fluctuations, and the implications for human development.
Inequality can contribute to volatility and the creation of crises, and volatility
can contribute to inequality.4 As I note below, some of the changes in our
economy—such as increased financialization—may have contributed to
increased inequality and volatility both directly and indirectly. (For example,
changes contributed directly to volatility, but also indirectly through effects
on inequality; likewise, they contributed directly to inequality, and indirectly
through effects on volatility.) The links between inequality and economic fluc-
tuations are complex, involving both direct and indirect impacts; for example,
volatility may adversely affect growth, and thereby the resources available for
social expenditures.
A final prefatory remark: while I focus on the link between volatility and
inequality of income, my real interest is on well-being, in a broader sense. I
will note below adverse effects on health and education.5 Volatility increases
insecurity. Even in advanced industrial countries, insurance markets are far
from perfect; most risks cannot be insured against. And even when insurance
can be provided, there are significant transactions costs. Most developed
countries rely on social insurance to mitigate these risks, and do so only



























social insurance. Because individuals are risk-averse, the loss of well-being
from high volatility is enormous.
Unemployment, however, has a direct adverse effect on individuals and
families: work gives meaning to life and dignity to individuals. The social con-
sequences of extended periods of unemployment cannot be compensated for
simply by replacing the income that has been lost.7
The next section of the paper lays out the basic two-way relationship
between inequality and volatility. The third section then discusses a particular
aspect of the inequality/volatility dynamics—hysteresis, the fact that the con-
sequences of an economic downturn can be long-lived. The fourth section
follows with an analysis of expenditure and that monetary policies can
either mitigate or exacerbate the inequality consequences of economic down-
turns. The fifth section turns to one particular aspect of the policy response:
how well-intentioned policies may actually turn out to have counterproduc-
tive effects on inequality. The sixth section then links these issues with
human development, with a special focus on developing countries. While
much of this paper draws upon experiences in both developed and develop-
ing countries (with studies often more available for the former than for the
latter), in this section I also highlight some of the important differences.
Inequality as a cause and consequence of crises
The UN Commission on Reforms of the International Financial and Monetary
System, which I chaired, argued that inequality played an important role in
creating the crisis.8 The link is simple and clear: increasing inequality9 effec-
tively redistributes income from those with a high marginal propensity to
consume to those with a low marginal propensity to consume. This reduces
aggregate demand. If the economy is to remain at full employment, the result-
ing reduced aggregate demand has to be compensated for somehow.10 The
route chosen by the United States (and, historically, by other countries) is
low interest rates and lax regulation. This led to a bubble, which did sustain
consumption for a while. But it was inevitable that the bubble would even-
tually break. And it was inevitable that when it broke, the economy would
go into a downturn.
Political economy11
Of course, there are other ways by which the weaknesses in aggregate
demand resulting from growing inequality might have been offset. But the
inequality itself made one of the key alternatives less likely: fiscal policy
(say investments in education or infrastructure) could have been used to
stimulate the economy, but the high inequality is often accompanied by a
demand for a smaller government and more fiscal restraint. The well-off
worry that a strong government might redistribute income away from
them—the median voter’s income is much less than the mean income, so
he has much to gain from progressive taxation.12
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In modern democracies, however, contrary to the standard theory, it does
not appear that the median voter is pivotal (or at least that what emerges from
the political process represents the informed interest of the median voter).
Policies are affected by lobbying, campaign contributions, and revolving
doors, so that the wealthy have disproportionate influence. Thus, as inequality
grows, at least in many countries, so too do constraints on the government’s
fiscal space.
The problem is aggravated by the increase in debt and deficit that almost
inevitably accompanies a severe economic downturn (such as the recent
one). Conservative forces, always looking for an excuse to downsize govern-
ment, seize upon the ‘unsustainable deficits’ as grounds for cutbacks in gov-
ernment spending, even though such austerity measures may do little to
improve the countries’ long-term fiscal position—and in fact may have
adverse effects. Austerity leads to lower gross domestic product (GDP),
lower growth, and therefore lower tax revenues, and higher social expendi-
tures. Experiences with IMF programs in East Asia and Latin America
confirm these adverse effects. (So too do the more recent experiences in
Latvia, Greece, and Spain.)
The burden is thus left to monetary policy to ensure that the economy
operates somewhere near full employment.
Wage rigidities are not always the cause of unemployment: balance sheet
effects and the risks of excessive flexibility. The evolution of the crisis has
also made clear that inflexible labor markets are not (always) the cause of
unemployment; quite the contrary, countries such as the United States with
high degrees of labor market flexibility have performed particularly badly, at
least in the labor market.13
Indeed, there is an important tradition in macroeconomics, dating back
to Fisher’s debt deflation theories,14 which suggests that greater wage and
price flexibility, under certain circumstances, may be adverse not only for
equality, but even for stability—and that the problems can arrive well
before deflation sets in.15 As wages fall, aggregate demand falls (as Keynes
emphasized); but even if prices fall in tandem (meaning that real wages are
not falling16), individuals and firms have unindexed debt commitments.
Firms and households are forced into bankruptcy—with an increase in econ-
omic disruption, a loss of informational and organizational capital, and a
downward shift in both aggregate demand and supply curves.
Such balance sheet effects can amplify an initial disturbance and, because
firms are induced to contract their level of activity, net profits are reduced.
With imperfections in equity markets, firms cannot simply go out to replace
lost equity.17It takes time for balance sheets to be restored—thus adverse
shocks are amplified and their effects are persistent as well.
Moreover, there are important asymmetries: while decreases in wages
make firms better off (improve their balance sheets), they make households
worse off. While increases in oil prices make oil producers better off, they



























changes has balance sheet effects, but in general the level of activities are
concave functions of balance sheets, so that those who wind up with
improved balance sheets do not expand their activities as much as those
who wind up with worsened balance sheets contract them (Greenwald and
Stiglitz, 1993a).
Why fluctuations may have adverse effects on inequality
We explained how inequality—and the attempt to maintain full employment
in the face of increases in inequality by creating a bubble—may contribute to
volatility. But the relationship is two-sided. Volatility contributes to inequality
through several channels. Moreover, as the discussion of financialization
below illustrates, some changes in the structure of the economy have contrib-
uted both directly to inequality and to volatility—and thereby indirectly to
inequality as well.
One way that volatility contributes to inequality, which I have already
noted, is that unemployment exerts downward pressure on wages.18
Another, focusing on inequality in overall well-being, which I will discuss at
greater length below, is that in downturns governments cut back expendi-
tures, and especially social expenditures that are of particular importance
to the poor. (Later I will discuss how monetary policy may also exacerbate
these effects).
The adverse effects on inequality are all the greater because the inci-
dence of unemployment is typically strongest among the least skilled
(Furman and Stiglitz 1998). This is not inevitable, but it is not surprising.
Because of the high costs of training skilled workers and the difficulties of
recruiting good workers, firms are more likely to retain these workers
through a downturn, assigning them, if necessary, to jobs requiring fewer
skills. Unskilled workers are more akin to ‘commodities’ traded on spot
markets.
But because skills decrease with unemployment, those at the bottom
have, at the end of the crisis, less human capital (relative to their better-off
peers), amplifying the effects on inequality and making them more persistent.
Just as there are policies that could mitigate the adverse effects of
inequality on volatility—or exacerbate those effects—there are also policies
that could mitigate (or exacerbate) the effects of volatility on inequality.
Later, for instance, I will explain how, in the face of volatility, misguided pol-
icies of inflation targeting may have exacerbated both inequality and
volatility.
Volatility may also have adverse effects through indirect channels. For
instance, in a more volatile economy, firms may demand high-risk premiums.
Thus, to achieve the same level of investment on average, the share of wages
will be lower. Alternatively, the level of investment will be lower (at any given
interest rate), and at least in the short to medium term this translates into
lower growth—and less resources for the government, including less expen-
ditures in public education and social protection.
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Policies in recent years have strengthened the nexus between inequality and
volatility—in particular, leading not only to more inequality, but also to a
greater sensitivity of inequality to economic fluctuations. The reductions in
the progressivity of the income tax system, the shift of pension plans from
defined benefit to defined contribution systems, and the broader undermining
of social protections have weakened the economy’s automatic stabilizers,
making the economy more vulnerable to shocks—and, in particular, adversely
affecting the poor in downturns.
In many countries (including the United States) the structure of govern-
ment makes such cutbacks almost inevitable.19 Delivery of education and
health services is a local responsibility, and local governments’ capacity to
borrow is limited (in the United States, many states have balanced budget pro-
visions in their constitutions, strictly limiting the extent to which they can
borrow). Hence, an economic downturn translates directly into cutbacks in
public services, including those on which the poor are dependent.
The role of financialization
Finally, financialization of the economy is an important component of the
nexus between economic volatility and inequality; it is responsible both for
increasing inequality and increasing fragility. A large fraction of economic
crises are related to credit bubbles, and credit bubbles can more easily
occur with an overdeveloped and under-regulated financial system.20
Under-regulation contributes to the expansion of the financial sector, both
because excessively risky and exploitive practices are not circumscribed,
and because there is increased risk associated with an implicit increase in
the ‘bailout’ subsidy—evidenced over and over again in the last 30 years.
Under-regulation/liberalization results in increased leverage (sometimes, as
recently, hidden through ‘financial innovations’) and a reliance on less
stable sources of funding.
As elsewhere, politics and economics are intertwined: large financial
sectors can exert influence to prevent effective enforcement of anti-trust
laws, at least as they apply to the financial sector, again with adverse distri-
bution effect, and to change regulations and laws inways that give the financial
sector more scope to exploit other parts of the economy. The 2005 creditor-
friendly bankruptcy law is a case in point—which further contributed to the
credit cycle by giving lenders confidence that they could recover money
even from those who could not really afford to repay. There is thus a vicious
circle: more profits in the financial sector increase their political influence to
promote laws and regulations that advantage the sector over other parts of
society; and at the same time, those laws and regulations increase the econo-
my’s fragility and the implicit subsidies those in the sector receive.
Within the financial sector, the same dynamic is at play: the too-big-to-fail



























supply them with funds at lower interest rates, because they know that they
will be bailed out.
Thus, financialization directly and indirectly results in the economy being
exposed to more (endogenous) shocks.21 Financial and capital market liberal-
ization has, in particular, exposed developing and emerging markets to exter-
nal shocks—and, in most cases, the promised benefit of being able to smooth
internally generated shocks has proved elusive. Capital flows have been pro-
cyclical, not countercyclical.22
But financialization has contributed to the vicious cycle of increasing
inequality and volatility in another way. The ‘discipline’ of short-term
capital flows—the asymmetries between liberalization of capital and labor
flows—has hurt the bargaining position of labor both within the private
sector and the public. Employers threaten to leave, to go elsewhere, unless
wages and taxes on capital are cut.
There is one more way that financial market globalization may have con-
tributed not only to the depth of the crisis and its rapid spread, but also to its
duration. In most economies, a major source of job creation is small and
medium enterprises (SMEs), which typically rely on smaller, more local
banks. There is some evidence, both from research at the IMF23 and Colum-
bia,24 suggesting that financial market liberalization and the internationaliza-
tion of banking has not been good for the access to credit of SMEs. So too,
the way the bank rescue operation was conducted—rescuing the banks
that were too big to fail, but allowing smaller and community banks to go
bankrupt—has meant that the credit channel remains clogged, with obvious
implications for the effectiveness of the second round of quantitative
easing, popularly known as QE2.
Empirical research using cross-country regressions to explain volatility
and the likelihood of the occurrence of a recession has confirmed that
wage rigidities are a less important source of economic ‘vulnerability’ and fra-
gility than an overextended financial system (see Easterly et al., 2001a, 2001b,
2003). These findings are consistent with more recent IMF research that
suggests the duration of growth spurts is positively correlated with equality
and the probability of financial crises, especially in countries with large finan-
cial sectors.25 These results are also consistent with the theoretical perspec-
tives advanced in this paper.
Hysteresis—the persistent effects of downturns
In the previous section, I explained both the role of increasing inequality in
causing downturns, and the role of downturns in increasing inequality. In
this section, I explain how these adverse effects can be long-lived, contribut-
ing to a weak and sometimes ‘jobless’ recovery. The phenomena that I want to
discuss here go under the broad rubric of hysteresis. Most importantly, pol-
icies—how we respond to the economic downturn—can not only affect
the pace of recovery but also have effects that persist long after the downturn
has officially come to an end.
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While worries about a jobless recovery have been associated with vir-
tually every recovery, analyses of data from the last few crises in the United
States suggest that employment recovery has become slower. How govern-
ments responded to the current crisis, especially in light of the looming con-
cerns about debt, may both exacerbate these trends and compound the
increasing problem of youth and long-term unemployment.
Increased unemployment is what follows from the difference between
the flow into the unemployment pool and the flow out. Even in a deep down-
turn, individuals are being hired; the pace of hiring is simply less than the pace
of job loss. Hence, in analyzing the dynamics of unemployment, we have to
think carefully about the factors that contribute to these dynamics (Green-
wald and Stiglitz, 1995). Measured unemployment typically does not
include those who have dropped out of the labor force because they have
been seeking employment so long without success that they have been dis-
couraged. But in reality, such workers are unemployed—it would certainly
be inaccurate to say they are employed. They would like a job, and they
cannot get one. One of the reasons that unemployment rates fall so slowly
in the process of recovery is that these ‘discouraged workers’ return to the
active labor market when job prospects improve.
One of the consequences of long-term unemployment is that workers’
skills attenuate. The longer individuals are unemployed, the greater the loss
in their ‘human capital,’ the skills required to make them productive in the
labor market. The result is that the longer individuals are unemployed, the
more difficult it is to re-employ them, at least at wages comparable with
what they received in the past. (Formally speaking, the lower the probability
that they will move from unemployment to employment in the next period,
and the greater the difference between the wage they receive upon reemploy-
ment and the wage they previously received.) This is one of the reasons that it
is important to do what can be done to have a speedy recovery.
It is worth noting that, aside from skills formation, which has been the
focus of this discussion, there are other aspects of human development.
Young people who see a society without good prospects—and good opportu-
nities awarded disproportionately to those with connections—will become
alienated from the rest of society. The sense of optimism and drive will be
enervated, and with it their willingness to invest in themselves and in their
communities.
This is an example of hysteresis—the path dependence of the economy.
In the United States and some other countries, there are other long-term
effects that are likely to make a quick return to full employment particularly
difficult. Here, I will note three.
Uncertainty—combined with large losses in pension wealth—has
induced many elderly not to retire, reducing openings for young people,
who are facing unemployment rates sometimes twice that of the average.
These individuals may not retire quickly even after the economy recovers,
partly because of the destruction of their retirement accounts, partly



























partly because they may have changed their minds about the virtues of retire-
ment versus work. (Unemployment increases when the flow into the labor
market minus the flow out of the labor force exceeds the rate of new hires
minus the rate of lay-offs/job terminations. A decrease in the flow out of
the labor force thus contributes as much to an increase in unemployment
as a decrease in hiring or an increase in layoffs.)
Inadequacies in systems of social protection/safety nets imply that indi-
viduals are more reliant on their families for protection. This is especially so
in countries (such as the United States and many developing countries)
where health insurance is provided by the employer. In these circumstances,
as the economy goes into a downturn, other family members may join the
labor force—having a second member is then the best (or only) fall-back if
the primary earner loses his job. This effect is called the additional worker
effect (see Basu et al., 2002.) With more workers seeking jobs, it becomes
more difficult for new entrants (with limited qualifications) to get a job.
The failure to restructure mortgages in the United States has left many
with large negative equity in their homes, impeding labor market mobility.26
This is again likely to increase both the unemployment rate and the decline
in wages—in effect, an individual’s job search is circumscribed.27
Bankruptcy and access to credit
This crisis, like a large fraction of crises, has entailed a collapse of credit
markets and bankruptcies of large numbers of firms. Bankruptcies also
provide examples of hysteresis: firms that go bankrupt when they cannot
meet debt payments (either because of excessively high interest rates, as in
the East Asia crisis, or because of deficiencies in demand, as in this crisis)
are not ‘unbankrupted’ when these circumstances are reversed; for
example, when interest rates are lowered or demand is restored. This also con-
stitutes a long-term loss of human capital—one of the most important
elements, at least from the perspective of long-term economic development,
is entrepreneurship.
In each of the instances described, the effects of the downturn are long-
lived, making a quick recovery all the more difficult.
Policy and inequality
The extent to which economic fluctuations leads to an increase in inequality
(either in the short run or more permanently) critically depends, of course, on
policy. My previous discussion highlighted how changes in automatic stabil-
izers (e.g. progressivity of the income tax, movements from defined-benefit
to defined-contribution social security systems, changes in systems of unem-
ployment compensation) can affect the extent to which GDP falls in response
to an adverse shock, say to aggregate demand, and can affect the extent to
which employment falls in responds to a decline in GDP. In the current
crisis, for instance, German policies managed to greatly limit the extent to
39

























which unemployment increased—it increased far more in America’s allegedly
‘flexible’ labor market. In this section, I focus more narrowly on two sets of
policies—government expenditures and monetary policy.
Government expenditures
Lower incomes for the poor have all the adverse consequences described
earlier. But, as other papers in this symposium point out, equally important
in generating adverse outcomes for human development are decreases in gov-
ernment spending. Economic downturns lead to deficits, and pressures to
bring deficits into control lead to cutbacks in public services, with particularly
adverse effects on the poor. That this would be so is not inevitable: it is con-
ceivable that government would protect social programs for the poor. But in
practice that does not seem to be the case, at least in many instances.
The reason is obvious: the poor are the least politically powerful in most
societies. They are the least able to protect themselves against cutbacks.28 As I
noted earlier, the extent of inequality in a society may affect not only the size
of the public sector, but also how it responds to cutbacks. Societies with
greater inequality may not only have a smaller public sector, but the
wealthy may be in a better position to ensure that government does not
impose cutbacks on them.29
For some countries (such as those with high debt and deficits before the
crisis), there is little choice but to cut back on spending. They lack access to
capital markets to finance deficits to maintain pre-downturn levels of expen-
diture. Some political entities (such as the states in the United States) may face
constitutional restrictions on their ability to borrow—although typically there
are ways to circumvent these restrictions to a limited degree; for example,
through infrastructure banks. (In the case of the United States, there is the
possibility of assistance from the federal government.) Even with these restric-
tions, however, it is not inevitable that there be cutbacks on overall expendi-
tures (most states and localities could increase their taxes) and that the
incidence of the cutbacks fall disproportionately on the poor. These patterns
are a result of the political economy considerations to which I referred earlier.
But other countries (such as the United States) face a more meaningful
choice. They are able to borrow. Indeed, for the United States, there is an argu-
ment for increased spending, because the long-term cost of capital is low. We
thus need to ask the following: why do they not sustain spending? And if there
are spending cutbacks, why do they so often disproportionately affect social
programs? The economic return to government spending may be even higher
in the downturn, since the ‘shadow prices’ of labor and other resources are
diminished. The benefits of spending are increased by the multiplier, the
fact that GDP increases by a multiple of what is spent, when there are under-
utilized resources. Indeed, in some cases (such as that of the United States
today) the returns on increased government investment are so large that the



























(in the short run from the multiplier, and in the long run from the increased
growth engendered) means that the long-run national debt is lowered.
There are several possible explanations why, in spite of the increased net
returns to government spending, there are typically pressures for cutbacks.
First, even countries that are able to borrow may face significantly higher
costs for doing so. They face worsened terms of intertemporal trade-offs.
Income and substitution effects would naturally lead to cutbacks, even if ‘pol-
itical economy’ considerations were not at play. (As I noted above, this is not
true for the United States, where real interest rates are close to zero.) Second,
there is often a diminution of perceived national wealth, with the breaking of
asset bubbles or, at least, the decline in asset prices. The persistent shortfall
between actual and potential output is a waste of resources—a waste that is
seldom anticipated in wealth assessments prior to the downturn. Finally, gov-
ernment receipts typically diminish markedly, with the decrease in GDP, and
especially if, prior to the crisis, they were partially bloated with revenues from
the bubble or boom that preceded it. It is costly (and politically contentious)
to increase resource transfers from the private to the public sector (e.g.
through taxes).30
I think, however, that the real reason for the cutbacks is a combination of
misunderstandings of economics and of the forces of political economy. The
analogy between government and households holds sway. If a household is
spending beyond its means, it has to cut back. Otherwise, ruin lies in its
future. Financial markets, with their focus on only one side of the ledger—
the liability side, ignoring the asset side—contribute to these misunderstand-
ings. And here ideology and interests intersect: many in the financial market
have an agenda to downsize the government, and looming deficits and
debts provide the rationale. (While money was pouring into the banks as
part of the bailouts, they conveniently put these concerns aside.) Improved
fiscal positions could lead to a lowering of long-term interest rates, which
would lead them to realize large capital gains on their long-term bonds.
These arguments help explain the cutbacks. But why should cutbacks be
disproportionately focused on social spending? My earlier discussions of pol-
itical economy provide the explanation: Many areas of government are hard to
cut (especially politically), such as defense; some areas, like disability pay, typi-
cally increase automatically. There is thus particularly strong downward
pressure on discretionary social and educational expenditures (and other
investments, for which the consequences of cutbacks will not be apparent
for years31). The political constituencies of the poor are typically far weaker
than, say, those calling for bank bailouts. And, again, conservative agendas
that have long argued against social expenditures seize upon the opening pro-
vided by the downturn, arguing that we can no longer afford them.
In some countries, such as the United States, one could make an argu-
ment that income and substitution effects make ambiguous the question
about whether social and educational expenditures should be cut or
increased. Today, real interest rates (even long-term rates) are extraordinarily
low, suggesting that it would make sense to consume more today, and that it
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would make even more sense to invest more today. Indeed, for those like the
United States that have underinvested in the public sector in the last two
decades, there are good public investments that in the long run will lower
the national debt. Increased public investments in infrastructure, technology,
education, and job training programs will promote growth and employment
in both the short term and the long term—and thereby increase government
revenues. Such investments will, furthermore, crowd in private investment,
with further benefits to growth, employment, and equality. Industrial policies
may be necessary to create a new dynamic comparative advantage, allowing
an employment-preserving and equality-preserving response to globalization.
Even if countries focus on the debt-to-GDP ratio, what they should be
focusing on is the medium to long run, not the short run. These policies
lower the debt-to-GDP ratio for at least three reasons: they increase the
denominator—GDP; they increase tax revenues, as a result of growth; and
they lower several categories of expenditures, such as those for welfare
payments.
More broadly, there are careful restructurings of tax and expenditure pro-
grams that can simultaneously stimulate the economy, reduce the deficit in the
short run, and lead to higher growth, employment, and improved equality.
Because of differences in marginal propensities to consume, any increases
in redistributive taxation can stimulate the economy and lower deficits.
Because the unemployed typically have a very high marginal propensity to
consume,32 increased support for the unemployed (financed, say, by a tax
on upper income individuals) will stimulate the economy. Because small
firms are more likely to be finance-constrained than large firms,33 government
programs targeted to them may stimulate the economy (both in the short run
and the long). Incremental investment tax credits financed by appropriately
designed increases in the corporate income tax rate will stimulate the
economy today and in the future. An increase in the estate/inheritance tax
can encourage consumption today, lower the deficit, and improve equality
of wealth and income.
Unfortunately, some of the proposals being discussed in the United States
(to take one example) go in exactly the wrong direction. Cutbacks in social
security (or even proposals of such cutbacks) will provide enhanced incen-
tives not to retire, making it more difficult for young people entering the
labor force to get jobs. Greater insecurity will induce individuals to save
more, diminishing GDP.
In short, for many countries, there are policies that would strengthen the
country’s long-term fiscal position and promote growth and employment both
in the short term and the long term—but these are often not the policies that
are chosen. There are distributive consequences, which may make these pol-
icies conflict with the seeming interests of those who are richer. I say
‘seeming’ because in some cases even their interests would be well-served.
But here, ideology may play a role: these programs might lead to a stronger
state, and they may worry that, while such a state might use its powers



























rest of society might benefit, there is no way of ensuring that the state will so
limit its actions. It might use its powers to redistribute wealth away from
them. The wealthier might even worry that any reforms could change the pol-
itical processes, which allow their perspectives to have disproportionate
weight (through campaign contributions, revolving doors, lobbying, and
control of media). This, in turn, might inhibit the role of the state in redistri-
buting wealth toward the top (e.g. through lax enforcement of antitrust laws,
giveaways of state resources, etc.).34
A vicious circle. Of particular concern is the possibility of adverse
dynamics that result when putting together the results of this section and
those of the preceding two: if societies with greater inequality adopt
weaker measures of social protection and less progressive income tax struc-
tures, and act as if they face tighter fiscal constraints, then an economic
shock will result in more adverse effects on inequality, weakening further
the political weight of the poor, weakening further social protections, redu-
cing tax progressivity, and tightening further fiscal constraints. Moreover, if
the wealthier feel more able to cope with shocks—and even more so if
they happened to be ideologically committed to free markets—then these
societies characterized by greater inequality will deregulate and liberalize
more, exposing them to more shocks. (The obvious adverse consequences
to human development are discussed in the section ‘Inequality, volatility,
and human development’).
Monetary policy
There is general consensus that monetary policy contributed to the creation
of this crisis. Historically, flawed monetary policies have been a major
source of volatility (e.g. in stepping on the brakes too strongly in response
to worries about inflation).
In this paper, my focus is on how monetary policy has affected the
inequality–volatility nexus. As I noted earlier, in the standard macroeconomic
and monetary models that informed the policies that led to the crisis, there
was little role for inequality. Not surprisingly, the policies predicated on
those models have arguably increased both volatility and inequality.
Inflation-targeting monetary policies as a contributor to inequality and
volatility. Doctrines focusing on inflation targeting, predicated on the mista-
ken belief that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for economic
stability, shifted attention away from what has proved to be a far more costly
source of instability—fragility in the financial sector.35 (The models also sup-
ported deregulation; it was argued that banks, in their own self-interest, could
and would manage risk well—far better than any outside regulator could. No
note was made of the problems posed by agency and externalities—the inter-
ests of those making risk decisions did not coincide with those of the rest of
society. No note was evenmade of the distorted incentive structures, designed
to encourage excessive risk-taking and shortsighted behavior.) Moreover,
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stabilizing the price level meant, at least in some instances, more instability in
real variables. Furthermore, there was no good argument for why, regardless
of the source of the disturbance facing the economy, the best approach to
adjustment should entail focusing on interest rates (rather than, say, exchange
rates).36 (See Stiglitz et al., 2006.)
Inflation targeting also meant that, in practice, unemployment was often
kept at a high level—at a higher level than may have been necessary for main-
taining overall economic stability. Monetary policy in most countries reflects
the perspectives of financial markets, and indeed, in most countries, those
from the financial sector have a dominant role in the boards that determine
policy. These doctrines serve their interests well, along with those of capital
owners: high unemployment exerts downward pressure on real wages;
increasing profits and high real interest rates enhance incomes of creditors.
The way such policies are implemented in practice may exacerbate these pro-
blems: when the economy is weak, real wages fail to keep up with pro-
ductivity gains, and may even decline; when nominal wages subsequently
start to grow, to make up for what happened during such periods, monetary
authorities, worried about rising labor costs, tighten, ensuring that there is no
‘catch up.’
Monetary authorities (in their role as financial regulator37) pushed dereg-
ulation of financial markets. As I have noted, this contributed to the financia-
lization of the economy—and at least in some countries, much of the
increased inequality was associated with this increased financialization,
both directly and indirectly through the greater volatility to which it gave
rise. Instability in cross-border capital flows, for instance, has been one of
the major sources of volatility in many developing and emerging countries,
and, as I noted earlier, capital market liberalization—the stripping away of
regulations to control these flows—has thus contributed to economic instabil-
ities. Capital market and financial market liberalization have facilitated the
spread of a problem in one country (such as the United States) to others.38
In the response to the crisis, further inequalities were created, some
of which (as I note further below) are likely to contribute to the slow
recovery. In the United States and Europe, interest rates were lowered to
record levels. There was, in effect, a transfer of money from those depen-
dent on interest receipts (including prudent, risk-averse retirees) to
banks. While the transfer helped recapitalize the banks, no conditions
were put on the banks. Lending did not increase, as was hoped. But as inter-
est-dependent retirees’ incomes weakened, so did their consumption.
Unemployment increased, both because of the resulting decrease in aggre-
gate demand (there was little evident increase in investment in response to
the low interest rate, although the low interest rate may have helped
increase stock market values, which may have had some positive effect
on consumption, to the extent that investors believed the effects were per-
manent39) and because the prospect of lower incomes from the only see-
mingly safe assets, T-bills, may have induced some workers to postpone



























But for the poorest in the developing countries (and even the poor in the
developed) the flood of liquidity generated by the Fed and other central banks
may have had another adverse effect. With America’s economy still weak and
that part of its financial system that lends money to SMEs still not repaired, the
money went to where it was not needed—the booming emerging markets—
and not to where it was needed. It contributed to bubbles and exchange rate
appreciation. The exchange rate appreciation threatened the stability of jobs
and employment in export-competing and import-competing sectors. Higher
food and energy prices have particularly adverse effects on the poor. In those
countries still following dictums of inflation targeting, the higher inflation
induced higher interest rates, contributing to a slowdown of economies,
even when unemployment was high, and where inflation was mostly
‘imported,’ and not the result of an overheated economy.
In turn, higher interest rates and an appreciated currency lead to serious
distortions in the structure of the economy. In those cases where export
sectors are the source of long-term growth, the adverse effects on that
sector (in the absence of government intervention) could be long-lived.40 It
is understandable why governments throughout the world have responded
with a variety of capital account interventions. But these interventions are
typically not costless.
How well-intentioned responses to downturns may impede
recovery
So far, I have explained how: inequality contributes to economic downturns;
economic downturns contribute to inequality; and governments’ responses
(both monetary and fiscal policies) may exacerbate adverse impacts on
human development both through actions that prolong the downturn and
through cutbacks in government spending. I have argued that these effects
are often long-lived.
In this section of the paper, I want to explain how even well-intentioned
policies to limit the extent of the downturn may at the same time prolong its
duration—at least as far as workers are concerned.
While there are often complaints about a jobless recovery, there is some
evidence that the last recovery was indeed jobless.41 In the United States, the
last crisis was, I believe, the first instance where workers had not fully recov-
ered from income losses suffered during a previous crisis. In 2010 the median
income was lower than it was in 1997.42 Making matters worse, as the
economywent into recession in this and the previous crises, there is some evi-
dence that there was more ruthless job cutting.43
One explanation for the changed behavior is increasing shortsightedness
on the part of firms, as they focus more on quarterly earnings. It used to be
that firms were reluctant to fire or lay off workers; there was a risk that
they would find employment elsewhere, with a resulting loss of firm-specific
human and organizational capital and individual-specific information. This
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was referred to as labor-hoarding.44 With real interest rates in this and the pre-
vious downturns lower than in most other downturns, one might have
thought that firms would be even more concerned to retain their workers.
In fact, they have been more ruthless in cutting back.
There are two possible explanations of the seeming change in behavior.
The first is that with increased emphases on quarterly returns, firms have
become more myopic. Norms have changed to reflect this, with praise
awarded to firms and managers that ‘bite the bullet’ and quickly respond by
firing workers or cutting costs.
Workers will, of course, respond to these changed norms. They will
invest less in the firm, and more in ‘general human capital’ that will increase
their portability and malleability. This means, of course, that the cost to the
firm of losing a worker will be less.
A change in norms also means that the adverse efficiency effects will be
mitigated—a firm that mistreats its workers in this way is no longer viewed as
a pariah. This is the new normal.
Additionally, in economic downturns, the shadow cost of capital
increases. That is, even if the T-bill rate falls, the spread between T-bill rates
and lending rates increases (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2003a). Moreover, firms,
especially SMEs, are credit-constrained. So even though T-bill rates have
fallen, firms act as if they had increased; especially in this crisis, in which
years after the onset of the problems, credit remains tight (partially because
much of SME lending is collateral-based, and the value of collateral, typically
real estate, is vastly diminished).45
Of course, these changes do have adverse systemic effects. There is wide-
spread recognition that systemic performance arising out of such myopic be-
havior is far from optimal.
There are policies the government could institute that might provide a
check, and some policies may have exacerbated these problems. In the
United States, preferential tax treatment of high bonuses based on so-called
incentive pay encouraged compensation schemes that, in turn, encouraged
firms to engage in behavior that led to higher reported short-term profits,
even if long-term profits were reduced. Requiring qualified compensation
schemes to have most of the compensation associated with long-term
returns would provide incentives for managers to think more about the
long term. Giving more voting rights to long-term investors (called loyalty
shares) might also encourage firms to think less myopically.
So too would policies that encourage investment in human capital (as
many countries do). Such policies would simultaneously act as automatic
stabilizers through incentivizing firms to hang on to workers as the
economy goes into a downturn.
The second set of explanations has to do with changes in cyclical pat-
terns of interest rates and exchange rates, interacting with changes in technol-
ogy.46 Although standard models in economics use a simple aggregate
production function, a more accurate depiction is provided by models with



























particular output and labor requirement, with relatively little substitutability.
As demand increases, machines of lower output-per-unit labor are brought
online. What matters then in the short run are not the choices that firms orig-
inally had, but how they exercised those choices. In a recession, if real interest
rates become very low, firms have an incentive to buy capital-intensive
machines requiring little labor. Wages may have fallen a little, but far less
than the cost of capital. Thus, as the economy recovers, there is less additional
labor needed to increase output.
In this and the previous recession, real (T-bill) interest rates fell markedly.
(Although the benefits of this change were not universally felt—especially not
by SMEs that faced increased constraints on capital availability, as I have noted;
it was large multinationals that benefitted.) This stands in marked contrast to
earlier downturns—in the Great Depression, short-term real interest rates
actually increased.
Exchange rate effects can reinforce or weaken this effect. For countries
that are capital goods importers, large decreases in the exchange rate make
capital goods more expensive, and discourage this kind of labor-capital substi-
tution at the margin. Thus, the policies of the IMF and the US Treasury in the
East Asia crisis—high interest rates with policies that failed to stem the fall in
exchange rates—set the stage for a quick recovery. Had they succeeded in pre-
venting the exchange rate from falling, it might have actually weakened the
recovery (at least as far as employment is concerned).47
Inequality, volatility, and human development
So far, I have focused on the nexus between economic fluctuations and
inequality—and how policy can mitigate or exacerbate the adverse conse-
quences that normally arise. Here, I focus on the impacts on human develop-
ment, understood very broadly. I have already hinted at several aspects: the
deterioration of skills that is associated with long-term unemployment, the
adverse effects on health of unemployment and the loss of one’s home.
There are, of course, multiple links: volatility may adversely affect human
development directly (e.g. through the loss of skills during an extended period
of unemployment) and indirectly. The indirect effects can be through the
impact on inequality, described earlier, which, through the ‘political
economy effects’ described earlier, lead to weaker social expenditures—
with adverse feedbacks on volatility itself, as a result of a weakening of auto-
matic stabilizers.
Volatility may also adversely affect growth.48 For instance, greater vola-
tility may adversely impact individuals’ ability and willingness to invest in
human capital, or firms’ ability and willingness to invest in physical
capital.49 In economic downturns, financial constraints will impede long-
term investments, including those in R&D. Greater volatility, especially in
the absence of adequate safety nets or systems of social protection, dis-
courages risk-taking.
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Earlier I described the adverse effect of volatility on inequality. But
increased inequality may have an adverse effect on growth. Successful
growth requires heavy investments by government (public transportation,
education, R&D, etc.), and support for such investments may weaken with
greater inequality—as support for a strong government itself weakens.
There is a vicious cycle—weak investments in human capital and human
development more broadly weaken growth, increase volatility and inequality,
and exacerbate the adverse effects of whatever volatility that occurs; but the
weaker growth, greater volatility and inequality, and greater sensitivity to
adverse shocks in turn lead to weaker investments in human capital and
human development.
Slower growth may adversely affect the poor in other ways, as well. At
the very least, it reduces the resources available to invest in human develop-
ment. Moreover, because of the adverse effects of volatility on inequality, and
the adverse ‘political economy’ effects of inequality, the benefits of what
growth that does occur may go disproportionately to those who are well-off.
The effects of volatility on human development can be long-lasting. There
is a natural lifecycle to each individual, and events that happen at critical
stages of their lives have lifelong effects. Prenatal and childhood malnutrition
will impair productivity throughout an individual’s life. It can stunt growth
and impair mental development.50 The damage cannot be undone in later
years. That is one of the reasons that, in the absence of an adequate safety
net, a severe economic downturn in a developing country can have such
severe long-term effects. (There is a concern that, in somewhat diminished
form, such effects can even arise in developed countries; in the United
States, in the midst of the crisis, the incidence of food insecurity rose to
more than 14%.51)
Economic downturns also interrupt education—and the interruption has
long-term effects. Large fractions of students never return; or if they do,
they do not go as far. In the case of developing countries, children may not
be able to afford even minimal school fees, or may be put to work. One of
my most moving visits to Thailand during the East Asia crisis was to a slum
community on the outskirts of Bangkok that had pooled its resources to
ensure that its children’s education would not be interrupted. Although
there were other such examples, the statistics suggest these are exceptions,
not the rule.52
While the broad economic forces that I have identified in this paper that
give rise to these links between volatility, inequality, and human development
are present in all economies, whether developed or developing, there are
some important differences. In developing countries, government-provided
safety nets (social protection) are weaker, and that means that the social con-
sequences (including the consequences for human development) are larger.
On the other hand, in some countries (where urban–rural ties are still
strong), social connections are stronger than in developed countries, and
migration back to the rural sector is easy, providing some ability to absorb



























while impacts on the urban sector are mitigated, large adverse effects are felt
in the rural sector. The influx of labor drives down wages, with particularly
negative effects on the landless (or land-poor).53
The greater wage and price flexibility in some developing countries may
(as I argued above) result in a deeper economic downturn, especially since
there are none of the automatic stabilizers that serve to dampen downturns
in more developed countries.
Capital and insurance markets too are typically less developed in develop-
ing countries, which implies that the ability to smooth the effects of shocks
over time and across states of nature is less. This increases the adverse
welfare effects of shocks; but, equally important, can worsen the adverse
effects on human development; for example, as a result of reduced parental
ability to invest in the education and health of their children.
Governments also may face more severe budgetary constraints, evi-
denced again in the contrast between what happened in the East Asia crisis
and the US Great Recession. Interest rates confronting the US government
fell dramatically, and the United States had no difficulty financing its enormous
deficit—even though its flawed policies were the cause of the global down-
turn. The East Asian countries, by contrast, had essentially no access to
funds, and had to turn to the IMF and G-7 for assistance, which they accepted
even though it was accompanied by onerous conditions, which, in some
instances, may have exacerbated the adverse effects on human development,
as a result of cutbacks on social expenditures.
Other aspects of the structure of developing countries may also increase
their vulnerability to adverse shocks. A larger fraction of production occurs in
SMEs, and these are typically dependent on banks for finance. Severe shocks
are often associated with major weakening of the banking system. At the very
least, job creation is stymied.54 In some countries, however, where financiali-
zation is particularly poorly developed, these effects are not felt, with the
result that these countries weather adverse shocks better.
The combination of weaker social protections, tighter budget con-
straints, less access to international financial markets, and a weaker
private-sector insurance system thus makes developing countries more
vulnerable to adverse shocks, and makes it more likely that these adverse
shocks translate into adverse effects on human development—often with
long-lasting effects.
Concluding remarks
I have focused my remarks on the impacts of monetary and fiscal policy, but I
should also observe that many other policies are relevant—creditor-friendly
bankruptcy laws can contribute to long-term inequality, with adverse effects
on human development, while laws that provide for constructive collective
bargaining can enhance equality. Lax enforcement of anti-trust laws can con-
tribute both to a less competitive economy and more inequality. Asymmetric
trade agreements, with free financial flows but constrained labor flows, may
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not only weaken workers’ bargaining power, but lead to higher volatility, less
efficiency, and more inequality.
Let me conclude by reiterating some of the central messages:
. The economic consequences of volatility go far beyond the loss of GDP.55
They even go beyond the loss of employment to which the reduction in
GDP gives rise—although the loss of well-being, as I have noted, is not ade-
quately captured by the loss of output from the under-utilization of labor
services. There are the direct social and individual consequences to unem-
ployment. But there are also further effects: the loss of well-being from
increased insecurity; the deterioration of health; the loss of human
capital; the adverse effect on well-being from the increase in crime that typi-
cally results—including increased expenditures on ‘defensive measures.’
Some of these effects are long-lived, and are reflected in negative impacts
on human development. (See Fitoussi et al., 2010).
. Issues of inequality and human development, on the one hand, and instabil-
ity, recessions and recovery, on the other, are intertwined. Inequality is both
a cause and consequence of volatility. I have described the multiple chan-
nels through which volatility adversely affects human development—
adverse direct impacts as well as (often reinforcing) effects through
impacts on inequality and growth.
. While I have noted the self-reinforcing ‘political economy’ effects of
increased inequality, there are broader societal effects—evidenced in a
sense of social cohesion, which can adversely impact individual and societal
well-being as well as economic performance more narrowly gauged.
. There are alternative paths to an eventual recovery. Some may be quicker
than others. Some may be more robust than others. Some may be associated
with a slower restoration of employment than others. Some may lead to
more inequality than others. But I have also emphasized that the effects
of the policies adopted to respond to a recession—like the effects of a reces-
sion—may be long-lived, especially when it comes to human development.
. The policy implications of this analysis are clear. Even if one was not directly
concerned with social justice and the distributive consequences of policy, if
governments seek to promote a more stable economy with a smaller likeli-
hood of a downturn, then they need to be attentive to inequality. So too,
once a downturn occurs, if governments seek a robust recovery—a
robust recovery within the fiscal constraints that were thought to apply
most acutely to developing countries but now seem to be widespread—
monetary and fiscal policies need to be designed in ways that pay very
careful attention to impacts on employment and equality.56
. Since developing countries are more vulnerable to shocks, efforts should be
made to insulate them. The trade-offs that they face are different from those
facing more developed countries. This suggests particular caution with
respect to capital and financial market liberalization.
. Finally, time may be of the essence. It may be the case that the economy



























downturn, a lack of a forceful response, may not only be costly in the short
run, but may also have long-run consequences.
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Notes
1 For a critique of this paradigm, see, for instance, Stiglitz (2011a, 2011b) and the references
cited there, including Stiglitz (2010c).
2 In particular, the UN Commission on Reforms of the Global Monetary and Financial System
(United Nations 2009) emphasized the role of inequality as a major contributing factor to
the current crisis. This work has spawned considerable research, including some cited else-
where in this paper. For an excellent survey, see Jayadev (forthcoming) and the papers cited
there. For a discussion of some empirical evidence, see Atkinson and Morelli (2010). Note
that we are not claiming here that all financial crises are caused by inequality, or that
inequality necessarily leads to a financial crisis. It is also important to note that the Gini coef-
ficient may not adequately capture the appropriate notion of inequality for purposes of my
discussion of economic fluctuations. If, for instance (as is in fact the case, see Dynan et al.,
2004), there are marked differences in the marginal propensities to consume of the bottom
80% and the top 20%, then a better measure might be provided by the share of national
income accruing to the top 20%. To the extent that fluctuations result from the ability of
the financial elite to ‘capture’ the political process, to strip away regulations, then what
matters is the share of income of that sector, or the share of income at the very top. See
Acemoglu (2011).
There is a much older literature relating economic fluctuations to the functional
distribution of income (which in turn is broadly related to inequality), growing out of
the Kaldorian tradition. Akerlof and Stiglitz (1969) show, for instance, in a simple model
that this can give rise to fluctuations of regular periodicity. For a more comprehensive dis-
cussion of the Kaldorian literature and subsequent related developments, see Jayadev
(forthcoming).
3 Berg and Ostry (2011).
4 Breen and Garcı´a-Pen˜alosa (2005) identified the cross-country linkage between inequality
and volatility. They point out that their results are not driven by the high correlation of
the two in Latin America.
5 There is even evidence that America’s foreclosure crisis is having adverse effects on health.
See Currie and Tekin (2011).
6 The absence of good insurance markets for these risks—which are among the most impor-
tant that individuals face—is a major market failure. The explanation of this market failure is
only partially accounted for by information asymmetries. See Stiglitz (1993).
7 These are some of the reasons that GDP is not a good measure of societal performance. See
Fitoussi et al. (2010).
8 United Nations (2009).
9 This analysis focuses on the impact of the change in inequality, and focuses on the link
through the accumulation of debt, which in turn is linked to credit crises. As we commen-
ted earlier, there are other links, such as that explored in Akerlof and Stiglitz (1969).
Although we do not pursue the question here, it may also be the case that the level of
inequality is related to instability. For instance, at any given level of average income, more
inequality may be associated with higher levels of consumption of durables, and purchases
of durables are more volatile than purchases of food.
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10 Thus, the build-up in debt is based partially on the basis of policy and partially on the basis
of irrationality (as is the case implicitly in the work of Minsky). Deregulation, in particular,
did not prevent the irrational build up of excessive risk. While it is true that the increased
indebtedness enabled average Americans to avoid the decline in their standard of living that
otherwise would have ensued, it is hard to reconcile the bubble itself with ‘rationality,’ and
especially some of the extreme practices in the credit market.
For a recent paper attempting to construct an inequality induced credit cycle within a
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework, see Kumhof and Ranciere
(2010).
11 For a more thorough discussion of these issues, see Jayadev (forthcoming).
12 See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Besley (2004), and Besley and Persson
(2009a, 2009b).
13 The US unemployment rate hit a peak of 10.2% in October 2009, while the peak reached by
Germany was 7.9% in July 2009 and Sweden 9% in April 2010. In April, 2011, more than a
year after the peak, the corresponding numbers were 9.0%, 6.2% and 7.5%. Data are from
Eurostat and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
This is consistent with earlier empirical work based on cross-country regressions cited
below showing that volatility is more associated with financial market problems than labor
market rigidities.
14 See Fisher (1933). Greenwald and Stiglitz (1987, 1988a, 1988b, 1990b, 1993a) have revived
and extended this theory, which has emphasized the adverse effects on balance sheets of
unexpected price declines—or even price increases that are smaller than expected. In
this crisis, considerable attention has been centered on these balance sheet effects. (For
a review and extension to monetary policy, see Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993b, 2003a).
15 There is a more general point: economic systems are not necessarily dynamically stable.
The fall in wages that results from an increase in unemployment may move the economy
away from the full employment equilibrium, rather than toward it. The implication is
that it may be desirable for governments to intervene to prevent wage reductions; by con-
trast, policies of increasing wage flexibility may exacerbate this instability.
16 See Solow and Stiglitz (1968).
17 Theories of information asymmetries have explained why that is the case. See, for example,
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990a) for an analysis of the consequences and references.
18 Because there is an upper bound on employment, economies with greater volatility typi-
cally have a higher average unemployment rate (a higher gap between actual and potential
output.)
While the notion that when unemployment is high, there is downward pressure on
wages might seem obvious, in traditional neoclassical theory, lower employment (at a
fixed level of capital) is associated with high real product wages. But such theories
begin, in effect, by assuming full employment, and hence are of little relevance to the ques-
tions at hand. In efficiency wage theories (for example, Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) it is easy
to see how increased unemployment is associated with lower wages. So too in bargaining
theories.
19 Of course, the Federal government could, through a revenue sharing program, offset the
impact of the reduction in state and local tax revenues.
20 This is consistent with the empirical findings of Easterly et al. (2001a, 2001b).
21 This is a fundamental way in which most of modern macroeconomics has gone astray: in
the standard models, the shocks to the economy are assumed to be exogenous.
22 For a broad discussion of these issues, see Ocampo and Stiglitz (2008) and the references
cited therein.
23 Detragiache et al., (2006) and Gupta et al. (2011). See also Gormley (2007, 2010).
24 Rashid (2005).
25 Kumhof and Ranciere (2010).
26 The empirical significance of this effect remains controversial. See Mike Konczal (2011).



























of ‘housing lock’ to suggest that there is a ‘new normal’ with a higher natural unemploy-
ment rate.
27 It is worth noting that some of the proposals being discussed for reducing the deficit in the
United States could exacerbate both problems. For instance, removal of mortgage interest
deductibility from the income tax (even in the future) will lower real-estate prices and have
a particularly adverse effect on middle-income taxpayers. (There are alternative reform
measures that might mitigate both problems.)
28 The other major category of cutbacks is investments, the effects of which typically are not
felt for a long time.
29 To my knowledge, there is not an extensive literature confirming this conjecture, or iden-
tifying to what extent this being so depends on the nature of the political system. In democ-
racies such as America where campaign contributions play a more important role, one
might conjecture that the well-off are better able to resist cutbacks that would adversely
affect them.
30 The final point differs from the first in that the final point focuses on the ‘wealth’ of the
citizenry, and the first on the financial constraints facing government, recognizing: shifting
money from the private sector to the public is costly, because of the distortions associated
with taxation; and changes in the rules governing the split between the public and private
sector are politically contentious.
31 This includes investments in R&D, with a consequent adverse effect on future growth. See,
for example, Stiglitz (1994).
32 For example, see Dynarski and Sheffrin (1987) for a discussion of consumption and
unemployment.
33 See Beck et al. (2005) among others.
34 See, for example, Besley (2004) and Besley and Persson (2009a, 2009b).
35 The models focused on second-order economic losses associated with relative prices being
misaligned, ignoring the first-order losses resulting from prolonged gaps between the econ-
omy’s actual and potential output.
36 Indeed, adjusting interest rates in response to inflation meant that when the inflation was
‘imported’ (e.g. when it arose from international prices, say of energy or food), it risked
vastly distorting the economy—putting all the burden of adjustment on non-traded
sectors, and imposing an even greater burden on the poor, as a result of the increased unem-
ployment and lower wages that resulted.
37 In the United States, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve reportedly weighed in strongly
against regulation of derivatives by the CFTC, supposedly an independent regulatory
body. The heads of central banks often have influence that extends beyond the realm of
their direct responsibility.
38 For a general theoretical discussion of these issues, see Stiglitz (2010a, 2010b).
39 Analyses of the effects from monetary authorities were not always consistent. As the end of
QEII approached, they argued that there would be no market disruption, since the market
had anticipated the end. But that raised the question, if they anticipated the end at the
beginning, why should there have been much effect then? A partial answer was a claim
that they believed in the ‘stock view,’ that prices (interest rates) depended on the stock
of government bonds held by the public, which had been reduced by the intervention.
Of course, in the meanwhile, during the period of QEII, the stock had been increased
(and would increase even more after its end) as a result of the massive government debt.
But, more broadly, the stock view is not totally coherent, or at least consistent with the
rational expectations models on which some monetary authorities seem to rely. For in
the presence of rational expectations, the Modigliani–Miller theorem for public finance
says that public debt structure does not matter (Stiglitz, 1983, 1988). In practice, it
almost surely does, but that is because markets are not well described by rational expec-
tations and there are credit (liquidity) constraints that are not incorporated into the
‘stock’ view.
40 Stiglitz (2011).
41 See in particular unpublished work by Miguel Morin.
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42 US Census income data, historical tables, Table H-9, [http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/
income/data/historical/household/index.html], accessed 20 October 2011.
43 A Boston Fed research paper by DeRemer et al. (2004) finds that the period following the
2001 recession is even a ‘job-loss recovery’.
44 See, for example, Clark (1973), Fay and Medoff (1985) and Miller (1971).
45 Evidence that firms act in a way consistent with an increase in the effective interest rate
includes cyclical movements in inventories and mark-ups. See, for example, Greenwald
and Stiglitz (2003b).
46 The discussion of this section is based on the highly innovative work of Miguel Morin
(2011).
47 To the extent that a country does not import machine goods (Germany), then the exchange
rate effect is not of immediate concern. But even then, for firms that export, the exchange
rate at the time of purchasing the capital good relative to that at the time they will be selling
the good is also of concern.
The magnitude of these effects depends on the elasticity of substitution (along the ex
ante production function), which can change over time and differ across sectors, as
Morin (2011) has pointed out. As he also notes, this can have implications for differences
in patterns of recovery across countries and over time.
48 The link between volatility and growth has been extensively discussed. There is a strong
presumption that higher volatility raises the risk premium on investment and diminishes
growth at least in the short to medium term. (In the standard Solow model, long-term
growth is determined by the rate of population growth and the rate of technological pro-
gress. Volatility can affect long-term growth only by having an impact on those variables,
which it may have.) See the discussion above and Ramey and Ramey (1995), Stiglitz
et al. (2006), and Imbs (2007).
49 There is considerable evidence that firms act in a risk-averse way (Greenwald and Stiglitz,
1990a) and that, especially in downturns, investment is reduced as a result of financial con-
straints (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993a, 2003a; Greenwald et al., 1993).
50 The World Bank argues that ending malnutrition is crucial to human development, because
of its irreversible effects on individuals’ physical and intellectual development. See, for
example, World Bank (2006) and the studies cited there.
51 US Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service figures, [http://www.ers.usda.
gov/Briefing/FoodSecurity/stats_graphs.htm#food_secure].
52 See, for example, Atinc and Walton (1998) and Knowles et al. (1999).
53 Similarly, even in the urban sector in some countries there is a shift from the formal employ-
ment to informal employment, with adverse effects on security and possibly human devel-
opment (less investment in human capital).
54 This effect arose in the current crisis even in developed countries: the bailout of the banks
in the United States was centered on the largest institutions. The small and medium-sized
banks (including community banks) remained with weak balance sheets years after the
crisis, resulting in limited lending to SMEs. These SMEs depend, moreover, on collateral-
backed loans, and the value of the principal source of collateral, real estate, was down
markedly.
55 As Fitoussi et al. (2010) emphasize, GDP is not a good measure of well-being, and volatility
and inequality themselves may lead to distortions in the measure. For instance, more
unequal societies may have to spend a larger fraction of their resources on defending prop-
erty rights—expenditures (like those for paying guards), which, while included in GDP, do
not directly contribute to well-being (see Bowles and Jayadev, 2006). As the last crisis made
so evident, bubbles are often associated with distorted prices, leading to exaggerated esti-
mates of GDP before the crisis.
56 It is worth noting that since the marginal propensity to consume of low-income individuals
(and especially the unemployed) is higher than that of upper-income individuals, policies
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